

Improving Joint Logistics – A Study of the Unified Logistics Command

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Thesis: Does a Unified Logistics Command enhance strategic and operational logistics? And if not, what structure or changes would enhance strategic and operational logistics?

Discussion: A Unified Logistics Command has been seriously discussed in recent years due to the undeniable trend toward joint warfighting and the obvious benefits to be reaped by using advances computers and information technologies. Changes within DoD's logistics systems are inevitable because it makes good sense to maximize the advantages waiting to be enjoyed. Therefore, the real question is not should changes be enacted, but what changes should be enacted.

To this end, an organization called CINCLOG was proposed in 1997 by Brigadier General Robert L. Floyd II, USACOM Director for Logistics. This proposal stands as the motivational source prompting the analysis put forth herein. The benefits and limitations of CINCLOG are analyzed by comparing the potential effects of such an organization to each of the seven principles of logistics.

Additionally, an alternative operational level logistics organization is proposed and analyzed called the Joint Logistics Management Command (JLMC). Conceptually, this organization would be built around an existing service logistics organization such as a US Army Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) or US Marine Corps Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The JLMC would be responsible for managing common-user items and support for all services and multinational forces in a given theater of operations. Such an organization would yield increased efficiencies and effectiveness.

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Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s): The analysis concludes that CINCLOG as proposed is not an optimal solution, but that the concept can be employed at the operational level to great effect. At the strategic level, the current DoD decentralized and somewhat redundant logistics system must be retained to ensure flexibility and effectiveness. Emphasis must be placed on standardizing procedures between the services to realize Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and In-transit Visibility (ITV).

At the operational level, JLMC should be established under each warfighting CINC to manage common-user items, contract for Host Nation Support, and complement the service component commands' sustainment efforts. Such an arrangement allows the services to retain operational flexibility to sustain their forces as their missions may require and enhances effectiveness and flexibility.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II (WWII) the Department of Defense (DoD) has undergone a variety of legislative and directive reorganizations,¹ such as the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA of 1947) and the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These were historic laws which imposed fundamental change on the organizational structure of the DoD and its command and control processes. However, the military services' logistics structures have remained relatively unchanged during the same period. In spite of routine and often intense scrutiny by auditors and legislators seeking increased economy, the individual services have managed to maintain a high level of autonomy in the area of logistics, each retaining the authority to organize, train, equip, and sustain itself.

General Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, endorsed Joint Vision 2010 which firmly establishes jointness as the way our nation will fight future wars. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally-based template to enhance joint warfare and serves as a benchmark for all services and unified

commands. One of four landmark concepts of Joint Vision 2010 is *Focused Logistics*, which attempts to fuse state-of-the-art information and transportation technologies to enhance rapid response to crises. Focused logistics is promoting the development of new logistics methods in order to accommodate the transition to a joint warfighting posture. The old paradigms of service-based logistics systems are giving way to the new paradigm of joint logistics systems.² In other words, new information and transportation technologies are making it possible for the services to share logistics information, reduce inventories, tailor specific logistics packages to requirements, and track the shipment of assets while en route to users. The result will be a more responsive and effective joint logistics system.

During the past 50 years DoD has relied on massive in-place forces with large standing inventories, such as War Reserve Material, and push-system pipelines to sustain its warfighting effort. In the 1980's and 1990's our armed forces became more forward deployed with the introduction of Maritime Propositioned Ships (MPS), Army War Reserve (AWR), and Air Contingency Forces (ACF), but the large standing inventories of supplies and logistical push-system

remained. Then, the Gulf War revealed that logistics systems needed still more change in order to support joint and multinational/coalition operations of the future. It has become increasingly obvious that logistics systems need to be streamlined, efficiencies enacted, and inventories reduced by relying on advanced information technology coupled with new business practices. These are the goals of focused logistics as described in Joint Vision 2010.³

Declining defense force structure and increasing political pressure to reduce redundancy within the services have raised questions about the efficiency of the services retaining separate logistic systems and whether savings can be achieved by reorganizing the way forces are sustained. Consequently, Congress and DoD are seriously considering logistic reform. Some in Congress and DoD are eager to streamline the services' logistics systems by eliminating redundant capabilities, consolidating systems, and increasing the centralized authority over strategic and operational logistics functions. These reforms are being considered both to increase efficiencies and enhance jointness. During the 1998 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 debate in Congress, Senator Kerrey stated "... whatever the size of our forces, they should be

supported by logistics and infrastructure that reflects their size.”⁴

One recommendation receiving serious consideration calls for the creation of a new unified command for logistics called CINCLOG (Commander in Chief Logistics Command). The United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) Director of Logistics (J4), the originator of the CINCLOG concept, envisions all service logistics functions consolidated under one command at both the strategic and operational level.⁵ In theory, this organization would use emerging information technologies and business practices to enhance joint warfighting, while at the same time fulfilling the objective of focused logistics as called for in Joint Vision 2010.

The purpose of this paper is to review past DoD logistics reorganizations, identify their driving factors, analyze United States Atlantic Command’s CINCLOG proposal within this historic context, and propose a possible alternative logistics organization to enhance joint operational logistics.

Chapter 2

Background

Four significant studies of the services' logistics responsibilities, organizations, and structure have been conducted since the end of WWII. These studies resulted in several important reorganizations at both the strategic and operational logistics levels. The first study that offered insight to the services' logistics relationships was conducted just after WWII when James Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, tasked Ferdinand Eberstadt to explore the possibility of unifying the services. Congress published the Eberstadt Report of 1945 and while it recommended against service unification, it did provide insight to many important strategic level logistic issues and explained the reasons the services retained different logistic organizations. The report recognized that logistics was taking on increased importance in warfare. If the nature of warfare was undergoing constant change as the report stated (i.e., increased intensity, expanding range of missions, larger numbers of forces, mechanized versus personal combat, etc.), then perhaps the services' logistic structures may have to change as well.

One possible alternative was to combine the services

and their logistics functions, but Eberstadt recognized that the degree of coordination in military logistics was limited by four factors: First, each service had different roles and missions which required unique logistics; second, he recognized there was a fundamental difference between naval and land warfare and the weapons used; third, he acknowledged that naval support demands more flexibility than ground warfare; and fourth, each service's logistics organization, philosophy and procedures were different.⁶ The report made clear that the problems with procurement and logistics during WWII were caused, in large part, by inadequate coordination between the services. Further, the report stated that communication, coordination and cooperation were the "principle elements of effective logistics and should be stressed at every opportunity."⁷ The report recommended against the concept of unifying the services, and stopped short of recommending consolidating the different services' logistics organizations.

The second logistics study, the Hoover Commission of 1947, was conducted after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act of 1947 was landmark legislation creating the position of the Secretary of Defense, the three military departments, and

the National Military Establishment which was later called the Department of Defense. Although this legislation did much to empower the position of the Secretary of Defense and unify civilian control of the different military departments, its effect on logistics was less profound. The Army and Navy were still using 12 different storage and distribution systems which gave the appearance of inefficiency.⁸

The Hoover Commission of 1947 was convened to assess the effectiveness of the NSA of 1947. Its findings were generally favorable, but highlighted concerns with the increasing defense budget and an apparent lack of teamwork between the services. Interestingly, one of the basic conclusions of the study was "Elimination of wasteful duplication is essential to good government, but the preservation, within sound limits, of a healthy competitive spirit and of service pride and tradition are basic to progress and morale".⁹ However, the degree of duplication between the different supply systems and the overall level of inefficiency became a growing concern. In November 1949, the Secretary of Defense directed that each service would continue to have its own supply system, but would coordinate stockage levels between themselves.

The third logistics study was conducted and concluded in 1955 when the second Hoover Commission released its findings recommending the consolidation of supply functions. As a result of increasing political pressure, Secretary of Defense Wilson established a single manager for individual commodities across service lines. Each single manager would determine total DoD requirements, and then procure, store and distribute stocks from one service to another.¹⁰ This was an attempt by Secretary Wilson to avoid consolidating common supply functions under a new logistics service and escape the complex problems of reorganizing the DoD.

The fourth logistics study was called the Vance Commission. It was created by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MacNamara to once again examine the possibility of consolidating the supply functions of the services. The Vance Committee provided the Secretary of Defense with three alternative recommendations: 1. Continue the single manager commodity program established under Secretary of Defense Wilson; 2. Establish a single supply agency under one service; 3. Establish a single supply agency outside of the services that would report directly to the Secretary

of Defense.¹¹ MacNamara chose the third alternative and created the Defense Supply Agency whose mission was to manage common items of supply between the services. A fifth logistics service was in essence created, which became what we know today as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Many people assumed that it was more cost effective to centralize the procurement of common supply items instead of having the services compete for the very same items. However, others questioned this decision believing that the single manager/single commodity system put in place by Secretary Wilson was an adequate managerial measure which simply needed more coordination at the DoD-level.

Another initiative resulting from the Vance Committee occurred in 1962 when Secretary MacNamara reorganized the services' logistics systems from a commodity-related organization to a functional-related organization. The reorganization was done to standardize the logistics structure and supply procedures of the services. However, many observed that it resulted in a loss of commodity expertise. Many of the service technical manuals and catalogues had to be rewritten after the reorganization was implemented which created an information gap that

manifested itself during the Vietnam War as "mass logistics"¹². During Vietnam enormous amounts of supplies were sent forward in the hope that an item would be in stock if required. This needlessly tied-up millions of dollars.

Since the Vietnam War, our national and service theater logistic systems have undergone other changes, but on a far smaller scale than those previously mentioned. Cost accounting principles have been incorporated service-wide into our maintenance depot-level repair and secondary repairable facilities in order to make them more cost efficient. Additionally, one function of logistics, transportation, has taken on increased importance resulting in the creation of US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in April 1987. This organization ultimately assumed the mission for strategic transportation of DoD assets and personnel in both peacetime and war. Generally, those national and theater service managed logistics systems have stayed mostly intact, just as they have since the Vietnam War.

At the strategic level, the individual services, DLA, and USTRANSCOM manage their respective logistics functions

without a centralized organization that has the authority to coordinate their efforts. The Joint Staff Director of Logistics (J4) does not have the authority to equip or sustain forces since this is an individual service responsibility. In other words, it is extremely difficult to establish a well-focused national military logistics effort because of the degree of coordination needed between so many diverse organizations and agencies (e.g., the Joint Staff J4, services, numerous DoD logistics agencies, and unified commands).

At the operational level, the warfighting CINCs retain directive authority for logistics, while the services retain their responsibility to sustain and equip forces in theater. Logistics functions in theater remain managed on an ad hoc basis executed by various joint logistics centers, offices, and boards and coordinated by the CINC J4. These ad hoc organizations manage common supply and service support during contingencies on a temporary basis; they do not function as part of a pre-planned and well-established plan.

Chapter 3

CINCLOG

Brigadier General Robert L. Floyd II, USACOM Director for Logistics, submitted a proposal to the Unified Command Plan (UCP) working group in January 1997 to establish a CINC-level logistics functional command.¹³ The concept of a CINC-level logistics functional command was recommended for further study because it would provide "one-stop shopping" for the warfighting CINCs for strategic and operational logistics. It was hoped that large savings would be realized through the consolidation of common support service functions and the increased use of privatization and out-sourcing as desired in General Shalikashvili's goals in Joint Vision 2010 and Focused Logistics.

The CINCLOG organization would combine the Joint Staff J4, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), and facilities functions currently conducted by the services. (See figure 1) In essence, a unified command for logistics would be set up at the strategic level with individual component commands consisting of: Support Services Command, Transportation

Command, Sustainment Command, and Facilities Command. The mission of CINCLOG would be to provide worldwide common-user transportation, logistics support and services to military forces and select federal agencies. The Joint Staff J4 would merge into this command with the Deputy CINC (DCINC) of USTRANSCOM double-hatted as the Joint Staff J-4 and DCINC of CINCLOG. All service facilities and depots would be massed and managed under the facilities component command. Additionally, one budgetary process would be used for all services by consolidating the Working Capital Fund Operations under this command.

At the operational level, CINCLOG would detach a portion of its organization, augmented as required from the services, and form a Joint Logistics Component (JLC) as part of the warfighting CINC's regional command. (see figure 2) Services would no longer have the responsibility to sustain their force. This function would be managed by the JLC in theater. The regional CINC J-4 would coordinate with the JLC for operational logistic support in his area of responsibility.

Benefits

What makes it possible for proponents of CINCLOG to propose such a radical change in the existing logistics structure? The answer lies in what Lieutenant General John J. Cusik, Joint Staff J-4, refers to as critical enabling factors.¹⁴ Advancements in information technology are making Total Asset Visibility (TAV) and in-transit visibility (ITV) increasingly likely. These advancements, coupled with the idea of combining the logistics functions of supply and transportation into one functional logistics command, offer promising new efficiencies in three of the four elements of the logistics process: distribution, sustainment, and disposition (the fourth is acquisition).¹⁵

General Joseph Heiser, the US Army Deputy Chief of Logistics during the Vietnam War, recognized that an effective just-in-time inventory system must require "...complete integration of supply data and maintenance and logistics transportation data so that we could know everything we needed to make logistics decisions"¹⁶. A commander possessing this capability would theoretically have a perfect logistics picture of his force and could make operational decisions with certainty.

Proponents of CINCLOG foresee substantial savings and efficiencies in stock control and transportation management (distribution and sustainment) due to technological advancements in computers and in-transit visibility capabilities. As a result, inventories will be reduced, just-in-time logistics and direct vendor shipments will become the norm, and CONUS-based forces will deploy with a much smaller logistics footprint. All requirements and resupply shipments will be known with certainty and tracked from the commercial vendor through the Defense Transportation System (DTS), and ultimately to the end user with constant visibility. Depot-level repair, salvage and disposal operations will become more cost efficient because service-owned depots would now be managed by a centralized organization using one common budgeting and billing system.

In theory the CINCLOG organization offers other advantages which need to be carefully examined. One advantage is unity of command for logistics matters. The warfighting CINCs would have one point of contact for coordinating and planning strategic and operational logistics (CINCLOG and JLC). This is consistent with Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics of Joint Operations, which

states, "For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics."¹⁷ Since CINCLOG consolidates all logistics functions underneath it, no other logistics coordination would be required by the warfighting CINC at any other command or agency other than CINCLOG. CINCLOG's JLC would have an Area of Responsibility originating in CONUS and extending to the rear of the COMM-Z.

During the Gulf War, unity of command for logistics was a concern for LTG William Pagonis, who was ultimately designated the Deputy Commanding General for Logistics in theater. He established an ad hoc logistics command (22d Support Command) responsible for fuel, water, food, vehicles, ammunition, all classes of supply (except equipment repair parts) for the Marines, Air Force, and the Army, as well as items common to all the services.¹⁸ However, he ignored standing Army doctrine which called for the establishment of a separate Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) to support the two Army Corps and other Army and Marine Corps organizations in theater. Instead, he canceled their deployment and established himself as the "kingpin"¹⁹ for logistics under the premise that it would be counterproductive to have another logistics command in

theater. Maintaining a single logistics point of contact in theater was his paramount concern.

Theoretically, CINCLOG would also be more efficient in other ways at both the strategic and operational levels. First, all classes of supplies (including repair parts) would be managed by one organization instead of the current five (i.e., DLA and the individual services). Second, significant savings could be achieved using one budget process to procure goods and services. Third, a centralized billing process would eliminate duplication of effort through the DoD and eliminate overhead. Fourth, the Facilities Command of CINCLOG could more proficiently manage the service-owned maintenance depots (overhead at all maintenance facilities could be reduced, maintenance functions could be merged, and in some cases depots could be closed). Cost data would be more readily available when examining the cost efficiency of a depot since a standardized billing process would be in place.

Dr. Michael D. Krause, who was also the Chief of Logistics Plans for the 22d Support Command during the Gulf War, makes a compelling argument for a similar logistics organization which he calls the "Defense Logistics

Service"²⁰. The difference is that no unified or sub-unified command would be established and command of DLA would rotate around to each service instead of becoming a component command. However, just like CINCLOG, all logistics functions are combined under a permanent logistics organization at the strategic level. Krause argues the one budget process, like that envisioned under CINCLOG, takes a "significant step towards commonality"²¹. And a centralized billing process is a "harbinger of future logistics unification"²². The proponents of CINCLOG, like Krause, seek to unify the services' logistics systems into one completely centralized structure, which in theory yields increased efficiencies and enhances jointness.

Limitations

Colonel M.T. Owens, in his article *The Use and Abuse of Jointness*, points out that many people have incorrectly interpreted "Jointness" to mean service unification instead of integration. Owens defines integration as "...improved procedures for combining the unique, specialized capabilities of the different services in order to enhance combat effectiveness."²³ While unification is defined as "an approach to defense planning in which some capabilities

are subordinated to one of more dominant capabilities."²⁴ Proponents for CINCLOG are also confusing the two terms. They, like Krause, are confusing the goal of Joint Vision 2010 by seeking to unify the services' logistics systems, rather than integrating their different and unique capabilities. Procedural improvements that would allow for the integration of the different service systems are needed, not the unification of these systems.

Presently, each service's supply and transportation systems are incompatible; data cannot be readily shared between systems. New procedures would have to standardize practices to allow the service and DLA logistic systems to share data and track the location of assets as they move through the DTS. As USTRANSCOM continues to develop the Global Transportation Network (GTN)(which is the DoD approved system to achieve ITV/TAV), procedures must be established to coordinate the integration of new computer systems as the services replace older ones. General Fogleman hit upon the procedural problems when he said, "If other organizations were developing or planning follow-on systems to the legacy system that were not open and could not exchange information with GTN, we need to know about them and stop or redirect the effort".²⁵ Procedural

improvements like these integrate the different services' logistics systems and are the keys to achieving Focused Logistics. Focused Logistics is not a pretext for unification of the services' logistics systems.

Proponents of CINCLOG, like Krause, argue that a centralized logistics organization is more efficient than a decentralized logistics organization. However, Henry E. Eccles cautioned us in his book *Logistics in the National Defense* that competing forces are at work which determine whether a centralized or decentralized structure is an optimal organizational structure. He cautioned that a completely centralized organization may not always be the most efficient organizational structure. That is, a more decentralized logistics structure may actually be more efficient and perhaps more responsive. There are tradeoffs regarding either structure. The factors influencing both types of organizational structure are in constant competition with each other.

Eccles stated, for example, that one of the factors at work is a "mutual distrust between government and theater commanders."²⁶ Simply stated, government leaders think theater commanders lack the national perspective to

determine logistics requirements, while theater commanders think government authorities lack the warfighting and operational perspective regarding logistics. In the case of CINCLOG, a more centralized organizational structure strengthens the national perspective at the expense of the theater commander and the services. Presently, the services retain the responsibility for sustaining and equipping forces; this practice increases operational flexibility and ensures redundant capabilities. During the early days of the Gulf War, the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to Saudi Arabia with a limited logistics capability. Consequently, they turned to the Marine Corps for common item logistics support until sufficient Army logistics forces were in theater. Both services retained separate logistics systems, however, operational flexibility was enhanced because of redundancy of systems. If CINCLOG were in place, the services would not have separate logistics systems, there would be no redundancy of systems, and logistics support during the early stages of future contingencies would certainly be degraded.

Principles of Logistics

The soundness of any logistics organization can be

best analyzed in light of the seven principles of logistics (e.g., Simplicity, Responsiveness, , Flexibility, Economy, Attainability, Sustainability, and Survivability). These principles have proven to be historically important and provide a sound test for any proposed logistics organization.

Simplicity

The span of control of CINCLOG is expected to incorporate the Joint Staff J-4, the four service logistics staffs, DLA, and USTRANSCOM. It would also include a Facilities Command to manage all military maintenance depots and operational bases and forts. This span of control is simply too large and is extremely complex. In terms of operating budget, this organization would require over 29% of the DoD budget, or approximately 74 billion dollars.²⁷ Additionally, the CINCLOG organization would remove logistics planners from the Joint Staff and combine them under a completely detached logistics command. Such a reorganization complicates rather than simplifies planning by separating logistics planners from operational planners. This increases, rather than decreases, the difficulty of integrating the logistics battlespace function into a well-coordinated operational plan. Even though the DCINC of

CINCLOG remains the Joint Staff J4, the action officers of the J4 would be sequestered from the other planners who remained on the Joint Staff. The dangers of "stovepipe planning" become even greater as a result.

Eccles recognized that complete centralization is not an efficient structure because of information flow.

"The sheer mass of data which must be collected, processed, and evaluated becomes so great that management action in response to changing technical and production developments and market situations becomes sluggish. The operating unit which is smaller, more flexible and responsive has been found to be more efficient."²⁸

A decentralized structure, where services retain their respective logistics responsibilities, streamlines the information flow, enabling services to focus on their unique logistical requirements. Close coordination is still required if this system is to work effectively. That is, service-specific sustainment plans require close coordination with the Joint Staff J-4, warfighting CINC, service component command and service headquarters during Operation Plan development and the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) validation process.

Responsiveness

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 4, Logistics, defines responsiveness as the ability to provide the right support, at the right time, at the right place. While it is true that both commercial and military logistics organizations strive to be responsive, the environment in which each operates is uniquely different. Proponents of CINCLOG fail to recognize this difference and mistakenly equate commercial logistics with military logistics. Commercial industry can centralize logistics operations to create efficiencies and still be responsive. Military organizations by their very nature, however, must function in hostile conditions where these operations may be destroyed by enemy action, making redundancy of functions and responsiveness necessary even if it results in some inefficiencies. In other words, efficiency is the paramount concern of commercial industry, but effectiveness is the paramount concern of military logistics organizations.²⁹ Consequently, CINCLOG may yield new efficiencies, but it does so at the expense of effectiveness. There are fundamental differences between military logistics organizations and civilian run commercial businesses. Therefore, a military logistics system must be decentralized, somewhat redundant, and

promote effectiveness in order to be responsive during war.

Flexibility

Flexibility is difficult to establish in a large centralized military logistics organization. Eccles said large centralized military logistics organizations face a dilemma because they must be both "flexible and highly responsive to enemy action".³⁰ His research supported the concept of each service retaining its smaller logistics system. Such systems, he argued, allow for greater flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness during actual contingencies.³¹

Economy

At the strategic level of war, decentralized logistics organizations are less economical than a centralized organization where logistics functions are consolidated. However, Eccles warns that a peacetime consolidation of functions must not be judged on how it impacts the peacetime budget, but rather on whether it contributes to sustained combat effectiveness.³² Further, creation of CINCLOG is excessive and discounts the findings of the Hoover Commission of 1947 which stated that duplication within sound limits was necessary to instill a healthy

competitive spirit, pride, tradition, progress, and morale within the services.

From an operational perspective, the JLC offers some advantages over our present method of managing operational logistics matters in theater on an ad hoc basis. A permanently staffed logistics theater organization where long and short-term plans were developed in concert with each other would more readily transition into well-coordinated and effective logistics actions. For instance, long-term and short-term logistics planners can be placed under the same command to do coordinated planning. This arrangement creates economies. LTG Pagonis realized this when he created his Logistics Operations Center (LOC) and Logistics Cell (Log Cell) in his 22d Supply Command (SUPCOM) during the Gulf War. The LOC conducted short-term logistics planning, while the Log Cell conducted long-term logistics planning. Both types of planning were conducted by the same organization and coordinated by Pagonis.

Attainability

The CINCLOG organization ignores the fourth element of the logistic process - the acquisition process. Any meaningful reorganization at the strategic level must take

acquisition into consideration. MCDP 4 states, "Strategic level core logistics capabilities are embodied in an acquisition system, base and stations, facilities required for maintenance of unique Marine equipment and the provision of service-specific supply items, and effective service-level command and control logistics."³³ CINCLOG separates the organizations which determine estimated requirements (services and service component commands) and those which would acquire those requirements (Sustainment Command). This arrangement hinders effective management of the acquisition and supply functions and is unnecessary.

Since the inception of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and its tie-in to the DoD Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the acquisition process has seen increased coordination and communication between services' acquisition programs. This arrangement also resolved an issue identified in the Eberstadt Report of 1945, where inadequate coordination between the services was identified as a contributor to serious defects in procurement and logistics during WWII.

Sustainability

CINCLOG ignores the Eberstadt Report's findings,

advising that each service requires a different logistics structure because of its unique tactical mission and equipment. For example, the logistical challenges of an amphibious operation requires more flexibility than that of sustained land operations.³⁴ Troops, equipment, and supplies have to be loaded onto separate ships, sometimes originating from different Seaports of Embarkation, and sequenced ashore in order to support operations ashore. Often, the logistical off-load occurs simultaneously to support the assault while under enemy fire. Consequently, the logistics system of each service is unique and demands that each service retain its respective logistics system to support the particular tactical mission and unique equipment.

Survivability

A centralized logistics organization is more vulnerable to asymmetrical attacks because of its reliance upon technology to provide total information dominance. It is folly to assume ITV and TAV, or any other technological information system will always achieve complete information certainty. Carl Von Clausewitz, the famous eighteenth century military strategist warned that "friction during warfare would create incidents- the kind you can never

really foresee- that lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal."³⁵ Our ITV/TAV systems will become targets to disrupt and misdirect the delivery of critical supplies and repair parts moving throughout the DTS. These attacks will be designed to create friction in the system. The services' redundant logistics systems, however, increase the likelihood that some systems might be unaffected by enemy asymmetric attack. The decentralized nature of their system also allows greater agility, unlike an overly centralized organization which is unable to adjust to changes and threats in their environment.³⁶ The important distinction, again, is for the different service systems to establish procedures which enable them to be compatible and interactive.

Chapter 4

Recommendations and Conclusion

Strategic Reform

A decentralized DoD logistics organization works best at the strategic level. Greater flexibility and effectiveness are achieved by permitting the services to operate separate logistics systems tailored to support their unique missions and equipment. However, common supply, transportation, and maintenance procedures need to be instituted to feed overarching logistics systems designed to produce ITV and TAV. This requires a greater effort of cooperation between the services.

For example, USTRANSCOM is developing the Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movement System II(TC AIMS-II) as a joint migration system used to feed GTN. However, uncoordinated alterations and improvements to existing service information systems, such as the Army's Transportation Coordinators Automated Information System (TCAIS), or Marine Corps' MAGTF Deployment Support System II(MDSS II)/ Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System (TC AIMS), prevents compatibility with TC AIMS-II. Service cooperation and common procedures will go a long way to making the services' transportation and supply systems

compatible and ultimately realize ITV/TAV. Additionally, commonality of equipment and repair parts should be pursued to the greatest extent possible to reduce acquisition and research and development costs. Although the different missions of the services require unique equipment, there are many cases where common parts and end items may be used. Our goal should be to maximize commonality where we can.

LTG Heiser calls for reactivating the old Logistics System Policy Council and Defense Logistic Advisory Board to instill this spirit of cooperation and implement common procedures across service logistics systems.³⁷ These were joint advisory organizations used by the services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to work together to standardize procedures and advise the Secretary of Defense to make decisions when a consensus could not be reached. Reestablishing these boards, with OSD oversight, would help establish common procedures. These boards, working together with the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), as part of the PPBS process, would have the budgetary authority to procure only those new information systems compatible with other service and DoD overarching systems.

Operational Reform

While our current decentralized logistics system works well at the strategic level, the operational logistics command and control organizations are not as effective. This partially explains the appeal for CINCLOG's JLC. At the theater level, logistics matters are managed by the CINC's Director of Logistics (J4), who conducts theater logistic planning and establishes logistics policy. Additionally, he operates a Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) which monitors the logistics readiness of the service component commands, oversees theater logistic capabilities, coordinates logistic support of upcoming operations, and coordinates with the non-theater logistics organizations providing support. However, these functions are supervised and executed in large part through various joint logistics centers, offices, and boards. The absence of a single, permanent logistics command and control organization, responsible for common-user support, disrupts planning and creates inefficiencies. A permanent command responsible for both long-term and short-term planning of common-user support would more effectively transition logistics plans into action. This problem was readily apparent to LTG Heiser who said, "Today there are no specific plans for common supply and services.... If we were to achieve such commonality in some future contingency, it would likely be on an ad hoc basis... rather than as part of a well-planned

operation."³⁸

In December 1996 the Joint Logistics Integration Conference explored two options to remedy the theater logistics command and control problems. The first option proposed using an existing service organization from one of the services and empowering it to control all common-user resources. The second option proposed establishing a headquarters element directly under the CINC called a Joint Logistics Management Command that would remain in a cadre status during peacetime and expand during contingencies. The services and CINCs were divided as to which option was the optimal solution. The JLIC deemed both options worthy of additional study; however, the specific organization structure, force structure, command relationships with the CINC and Joint Logistics Boards, and functions to be performed by this organization were not fully developed. The Joint Staff J4 assumed the responsibility to further refine the concepts and develop a proposed theater logistics command and control organization for CINC and service review prior to presentation to the JROC.³⁹

The two options presented during the JLIC are not mutually exclusive. That is, the JLMC should be organized

around a permanently standing organization such as a Marine Corps Force Service Support Group (FSSG) or an Army Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) and be assigned directly under the command of the warfighting CINC. Any other command relationship to the CINC would be ineffective and less responsive to his logistics priorities and requirements. To extend operational reach and increase the effectiveness of theater logistics, the JLMC should be established, integrating common-user logistics functions in a theater of operations. This organization would be augmented by representatives from all the services, liaison officers, and individual reserves during time of crisis.

During peace, JLMC should be exercised periodically by deploying and exercising contracting responsibilities for Host Nation Support and other common-user functions. It would be designed to deploy early in the event of a contingency with a high priority in the TPFDD. A high priority is needed to ensure that the JLMC is in theater early enough to establish support as the warfighters arrive in theater. This would go a long way to resolve problems such as those encountered during the initial stages of the Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployment.

A JLMC would provide a single point for common-user theater logistics matters, ensuring unity of command. Such

an organization would be extremely flexible, able to move rapidly into a warfighting posture, and could more easily transition to combined operations. Additionally, augmentation from DoD agencies, such as DLA and supporting CINCs, would also be required to fully round out this organization. JLMC would work directly under the command of the warfighting CINC, supervising the joint centers, offices and boards, allowing the CINC J4 to focus on establishing theater logistic priorities and policies. However, the JLMC would be empowered to make those logistics decisions regarding common support and services, consistent with the CINC J4's priorities. (Figure 3 identifies the JLMC command relationship with the CINC and its oversight responsibility of the Joint Logistics Boards)

LTG Pagonis recognized the versatility of a similarly organized unit during the Gulf War when he wrote about his 22d SUPCOM saying, "...tailoring provisional organizations to meet the needs of the mission at hand became a way of life. Flexibility was the watchword, and this was the way to do it."⁴⁰ Unlike the JLC envisioned as a part of CINCLC, the JLMC complements the sustainment efforts of the service component commands instead of assuming their sustainment mission. Service competition over goods and services provided by the host nation is avoided since the JLMC is solely providing common-user support.

JLMC Organization

The JLMC's headquarters would be organized in a standard general staff organization since its foundation unit (TAACOM/FSSG) will already be formed in this manner. A short-term and a long-term planning cell should be created under the staff cognizance of the JLMC Operations Officer (G3). This design capitalizes on the same convention developed by LTG Pegonis during the Gulf War, dividing near-term and long-term planning responsibilities within his 22nd SUPCOM. The Logistics Operations Center would focus on near-term logistics planning, that occurring in the next 72 hour period, while the Logistics Planning Cell would focus on logistics planning of a long-term nature, that beyond 72 hours. A Business Operations Center (BOC) would also be established where the logistic functions would actually be executed. (Figure 4)

The JLMC should be staffed by representatives from all the services, DoD agencies, and supporting CINCs. Likewise, the Logistics Operations Center and Logistics Planning Center would be jointly staffed with all logistics functions represented. That is, a Supply, Transportation, Engineering, Health Services, Services, and Maintenance support representative would be assigned to each planning cell. (Figure 5)

The Business Operations Center (BOC) is the heart of the JLMC operation. Here, common logistics requirements identified by the two separate planning cells would be procured. A contracting office would contract for host nation support for all services and coalition nations participating in the operation. Competition between services and coalition partners would be avoided by centralizing the contracting of all host nation support requirements through this office. Additionally, the BOC would be manned with service and combined customer support representatives on a 24 hour basis. Representatives from DoD logistics agencies such as DLA and supporting CINCs would also be assigned to the BOC in order to coordinate the support required from their respective parent organization. Lastly, a host nation support coordinator would interface with those host nation companies wanting to provide support and services.

Since the foundation of the JLMC would be built around an existing logistics organization, very little expense would be incurred in terms of people and equipment. Personnel augmenting the JLMC from other services would have to be designated; approximately 30-40% of the JLMC's personnel would be from other services. A total of 100 people would be sufficient to man this organization for 24-hour operations. Approximately 30 personnel would be required in the Business Operations Center where operations

would be conducted around the clock on two 12-hour shifts. Equipment needs would be minimal, since it would primarily be a logistics command and control organization. Critical requirements would include communications equipment and computers that would be maintained by the G6 of the JLMC. Additionally, joint exercise funds would have to be set aside in order to periodically exercise the staff by activating it during joint logistics exercises. Approximately \$3M per year would be needed to cover Temporary Active Duty and transportation costs of this organization.


Conclusion

At the strategic level, procedures must be standardized so that the different and unique service logistics systems are able to feed overarching national systems designed to achieve ITV and TAV. This will allow technology to work for us while avoiding the pitfalls commonly associated with over centralization.

At the operational level, a predesignated and permanently established joint logistics organization (JMLC) must be created as part of all geographic CINCs to manage common-user items, contract for Host Nation Support, and complement the service component commands' sustainment


efforts. Although a more centralized organization is created to manage common-user items, the services retain operational flexibility to sustain and organize their forces as their missions may require. Both operational logistics effectiveness and flexibility will be improved by this arrangement.

USACOM CINCLOG Concept




(Figure 1)

Joint Logistics Component Command




(Figure 2)




(Figure 3)

Joint Logistics Management Command General Staff



(Figure 4)

(Number of personnel)



(Figure 5)

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Notes

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³ LTG John W. Cusick, USA and LTC Carol D. King, USAF, "A Joint Logistics Vision for the Future," *Logistics Spectrum* (November-December 1996): 7.

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⁵ CINCUSACOM Memorandum J4 SER 6U4160 dtd 10 January, 1997

⁶ Jerome G. Peppers, *Military Logistics: A History of United States Military Logistics 1935-1985* (Logistics Education Foundation Publishing, 1988), 153.

⁷ Peppers, 154.

⁸ Peppers, 208.

⁹ Peppers, 158.

¹⁰ Peppers, 208.

¹¹ Peppers, 209.

¹² Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., *Soldier Supporting Soldiers* (Center of Military History US Army, 1991), 150.

¹³ CINCUSACOM Memorandum J4 SER 6U4160 dtd 10 January, 1997

¹⁴ Cusick and King, 7.

¹⁵ Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, January 1995), I-5.

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¹⁷ Joint Pub 4-0, II-6.

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- ¹⁸ William G. Pagonis, *Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War*, (Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 97.
- ¹⁹ Pagonis, 215.
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- ²¹ Krause, 12.
- ²² Krause, 13.
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- ²⁴ Owens, 51.
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- ²⁶ Henry E. Eccles, *Logistics in the National Defense*, (The Stackpole Company, 1959), 207.
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- ²⁸ Eccles, 203.
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³⁷ Heiser, 237.

³⁸ Heiser, 110.

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⁴⁰ Pagonis, 57.